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The BASIC effect on global climate governance.
Power changes and regime shifts
Résumé
La question traitée dans  cet  article  est  celle  du rôle joué par les pays du groupe BASIC 
(Brésil,  Afrique  du  Sud,  Inde,  Chine)  dans  l’indétermination  des  négociations  sur  le 
changement  climatique.  Nous  adoptons  la  ligne  d'analyse  de  l'économie  politique 
internationale (EPI) et mobilisons deux catégories de facteurs explicatifs: l'hétérogénéité des 
préférences politiques et  les variations dans la distribution de la  puissance.  Notre analyse 
indique que l’indétermination tient aux variations de la puissance bien davantage qu’au jeu 
des préférences, relativement constantes.
Abstract
In this paper we address the issue of the indeterminacy of climate change negotiations and 
examine the role played by the BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) in 
this indeterminacy. Mobilising the analytical tools of international political economy (IPE), 
we  show  that  changes  in  the  distribution  of  power  over  the  last  20  years  explain  the 
indeterminacy of negotiation outcomes far more than changes in political preferences, which 
have remained fairly stable. 
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The BASIC effect on global climate governance: power changes and regime shifts
This  article  focuses  on  the  global  governance  of  climate  change,  in  other  words  the 
institutional  arrangements  (formal  agreements  and  associated  negotiations)  that  organise 
collective State action at the multilateral level in the field of climate change. International 
public policies to tackle climate change are mainly aimed at limiting anthropogenic emissions 
of greenhouse gases, emissions that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change1 (IPCC) 
presents through its  different  reports  as an increasingly credible  and serious  threat  to the 
environment and to development. Action on climate change is,  in this respect, one of the 
fundamental pillars of the Rio 1992 compromise on sustainable development2. It is certainly 
not the only one, and in places we will  refer to the other aspects  of this compromise on 
sustainable  development.  But  our  paper  will  concentrate  on  the  climate  component. 
Consequently, it will also deal extensively with the Kyoto international regime3, which has 
guided collective international action to combat greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 1997, 
and whose first commitment period ended on 31 December 2012.
The starting point for this article is the fundamental indeterminacy marking the “post-Kyoto” 
negotiations. The 17th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) held in Durban in late 2011 led to a compromise providing for 
the adoption in 2015 of a future agreement (which will enter into force in 2020), whose legal 
nature remains uncertain. The Durban text mentions several options: a “protocol”, “another 
legal  instrument”,  or  even  an  “agreed  outcome  with  legal  force”.  These  different  terms 
suggest rather than assert the idea of a legally binding global agreement4. An instrument may 
be  legal  but  non-binding;  and  Canada’s non-compliance  with  its  commitments  under  the 
Kyoto Protocol, then its complete withdrawal, show that an agreement may be legally binding 
even though the constraint is never truly applied or may be reversible. Climate governance 
thus appears to have stopped in midstream, leaving behind it the Kyoto architecture, which 
looks set to disappear, and ahead of it experimental negotiations focusing as much on the legal 
architecture as on the nature of commitments.
The indeterminacy surrounding the post-Kyoto regime coincides with the assertion of the 
BASIC countries (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) in the climate change negotiations. 
Individually,  and  even  more  so  collectively,  these  countries  have  strongly  influenced the 
process since the Bali Conference in 20075, alternating between defensive and offensive or 
1  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established in 1988 at the request of the G7 by 
the  World  Meteorological  Organization  and  the  United  Nations  Environment  Programme.  Its  First 
Assessment Report (FAR) was published in 1990. Four have so far been released and the fifth is expected to 
be finalised in 2014.
2  For  a  recent  presentation  of  the  four  documents  resulting  from  the  Rio  Earth  Summit  in  1992  (the 
Declaration  on  Environment  and  Development,  the  Framework  Convention  on  Climate  Change  – 
UNFCCC–, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and Agenda 21), see [CAS (2012)].
3  The Kyoto Protocol concluded negotiations launched five years earlier by the signature of the UNFCCC. It 
set the target of reducing emissions of six greenhouse gases by at least 5.2% by 2012 relative to the base year 
1990.
4  One question summarises the indeterminacy and doubt surrounding the outcome of the negotiations still 
underway: “will we ever have a global climate agreement?” (Tubiana 2012).
5  The BASIC group was officially established by the agreement of 28 November 2009. The four countries 
committed to act jointly at the Copenhagen climate conference. BASIC should not be confused with the 
BRICS group (the same plus Russia).
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“proactive” positions, in the jargon of negotiations. The Bali process should have concluded 
in Copenhagen in December 2009 with a global agreement. Copenhagen, on the initiative of 
the  BASIC countries,  reshuffled the  cards  of  climate  diplomacy, invented  a  new kind  of 
agreement  (the  “Copenhagen  agreement”)  with  no  legal  status  (the  UNFCCC secretariat 
simply  “noting”  the  agreement),  and  opened  the  door  to  experimentation.  The  climate 
governance being invented and developed today is concomitant with the increasing role of the 
emerging countries in the negotiations.
Against this background, the aim of this article is to further explore this coincidence between 
the indeterminacy surrounding the post-Kyoto period and the emergence of the BASIC group. 
How are this indeterminacy and the conflicts it conceals linked to the emergence? This is the 
questions we will attempt to answer here. First, it should be noted that the goal is by no means 
to  determine  who  is  to  blame  or,  alternatively,  to  relieve  the  BASIC  countries  of  their 
potential  responsibilities  in  what  may  also  be  seen  as  a  fundamental  questioning  of  the 
achievements of Rio (1992) and Kyoto (1997). Our approach to the question is systemic and 
consists in examining how the emergence of new powers “objectively” affects the system 
beyond and even independently of calculations and strategies. It also consists in establishing 
how a  systemic  change  results  in  the  indeterminacy  of  the  outcome,  in  this  case  in  the 
impossibility  of  defining  an  extension  or  a  stable  substitute  for  the  Kyoto  international 
regime.  By  placing  the  emphasis  on  power,  we  mobilise  an  inherently  relative  concept 
[Krasner S. D. (1991)] that makes changes in the distribution of power, rather than in the 
evolution of one country or another, the potential  determinant of the institutional changes 
observed.
Economic analysis is accustomed to these situations of indeterminacy concerning the outcome 
or  the  “solution”.  It  generally  links  them to  multiple  equilibria  configurations  where  the 
Pareto criteria are not enough to eliminate the indeterminacy: indeed, on the basis of these 
criteria alone, the equilibria may be equivalent for the system, but not for the actors involved. 
The  current  problem  of  global  climate  governance  is  of  this  nature:  the  fundamental 
indeterminacy of a choice between multiple equilibria. Analysis of the factors that led to this 
indeterminacy and of those likely to eliminate it will be conducted in the field of international 
political economy (IPE), which is particularly recommended for describing and explaining the 
political factors “that will play a decisive role in the selection of a specific solution”6.
The article is divided into three parts. The first lays the foundations for the analysis, with on 
the one hand the use of the concept of an international regime as forged by international 
political economy, and, on the other, the interactions between two political variables (actor 
preferences  and  the  distribution  of  power).  The  following  sections  describe  the  “BASIC 
effect”, providing insights that converge towards the same indeterminacy in the course of 
global climate governance. Thus, the second part links the emergence to the breakdown of the 
“Rio compromise”,  adopting a constructivist  approach in  reference to the IPE movement, 
which  makes  the  compromise  a  necessary  condition  for  the  creation  and  stability  of  an 
international  regime.  The  third  part  envisages  the  BASIC effect  from the  perspective  of 
“changing  the  game”,  this  time  in  reference  to  a  rationalist  conception  of  international 
6 Berthaud and Kébabdjian 2006, p. 12
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regimes7. We will make the distinction8 between problems of collaboration9 and problems of 
coordination as a guide to enable us to verify whether the emergence of the BASIC group 
places the game in a “battle of the sexes”10 type configuration in which State cooperation is 
not the solution, but the problem. Using climate change as a consubstantial component of 
what we define as the Rio (1992) sustainable development regime, we summarise our findings 
with the analytical description of its rise and fall, before concluding on what would make it 
shift to a stable post-2015 sustainable development international regime. 
The analytical basis
With the concept of the international regime, international political economy (IPE) provides a 
useful tool for establishing – or refuting – the indeterminacy of global climate governance; we 
begin by presenting it. Indeed, IPE can be used to isolate the political factors likely to explain 
the position of BASIC in the current indeterminacy of global climate governance, once this 
indeterminacy has been established. We go on to present these factors.
The concept of the international regime
The concept of the international regime developed by IPE provides an analytical framework 
to  distinguish  situations  of  indeterminacy  (a  lack  of  regime)  from  those  in  which  this 
indeterminacy  is  removed  (existence  of  a  regime).  It  also  makes  it  possible  to  compare 
different types of international regimes according to the problems they address and the rules 
they produce – which tells us about the properties of the game and the dynamics of the forces. 
An international regime is thus seen as a particular type of institutional arrangement produced 
by the balance of  powers  and preferences for a  given problem of international  economic 
relations.  The  general  principles  that  the  Rio  Earth  Summit  (1992)  gave  to  collective 
international action, combined with the rules and procedures decided on in Kyoto (1997), 
form an international regime that for convenience we will call the “Kyoto regime”. The Kyoto 
regime responds where climate issues are concerned to the “common bad” created by the 
accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. The outcome adopted for Kyoto refers to principles 
(legally binding commitments on quantified reduction targets and common but differentiated 
responsibilities) that express a specific configuration of preferences and of the distribution of 
power.
Finally, positioning ourselves in the field of IPE leads us to address the current indeterminacy 
of global climate governance not from the viewpoint of the “intrinsic” flaws of the previous 
solution (assumption that the “Kyoto regime”11 failed), but rather from the perspective of the 
changes produced in the game of preferences by the variations in power associated with the 
7  Krasner 1983, Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997.
8  Following Stein 1983.
9  Problems of assurance according to Snidal 1985a.
10  The name given in game theory to this type of configuration by Luce and Raiffa 1957). Krasner 1991 prefers 
to call it the “ocean mountain dilemma”.
11  The literature on the assessment of Kyoto is abundant, such as the CAE (2009) report, in which Tirole 
“establishes  the  framework  for  what  would  be,  from  an  economist’s  viewpoint,  a  good  agreement  at 
Copenhagen”  (presentation  of  the  report,  emphasis  added).  See  also  [Barrett  S.  (2008)]  for  an  equally 
normative analysis that is extended to political economy (governance issues).
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emergence of the BASIC group12. This BASIC effect takes two different forms, which will be 
examined successively in the text by combining the different IPE styles of analysis.
Two political factors
The  first  explanatory  factor  is  the  strength  of  actors,  in  other  words  their  power  in 
international relations. Variations in power automatically affect the degree of asymmetry of 
the international system. The BASIC countries have more than doubled their economic weight 
in the international system (table 1); we infer from this that they have also increased their 
political power over the last 20 years. Their emergence has affected the equilibrium of the 
system and the capacity  of  the different  actors  to  influence the choice of  solution  to  the 
problem of collective action in the climate negotiations.
Table 1. The weight of BASIC in 1990 and 2012. Share of global GDP (in PPP: 2005) as 
% of global total
1990 2012*
Brazil 3 2.9
China 3.5 14.8
India 3 6
South Africa 0.8 0.8
BASIC 10.3 24.5
USA 21.4 19.0
European Union (27) 18.4 19.4
Japan 8.9 5.5
* CHELEM-CEPII estimations 
Data Source: [CEPII (2011)]
Actor preferences constitute the second factor capable of explaining the contribution of a 
country  or  group of  countries  to  a  potential  state  of  indeterminacy.  The configuration of 
preferences at a given point, their heterogeneity and their variations over time play a key role 
in explaining institutional arrangements and their changes13. BASIC remains to date a group 
of developing countries14 that has kept in climate negotiations to the position of the G77, or 
close to it15, thereby fostering a rather conservative diplomatic position within the UN forums, 
12  A comprehensive study should not be limited to the BASIC group. Mexico and Russia are also major actors 
in climate negotiations.
13  It  could  be  said  that  if  and  when  preferences  are  homogeneous,  the  political  aspect  of  the  problem 
disappears, leaving only its economic aspect.
14  A category that, if we recall, was introduced into the international system at the end of the 1960s and which 
gives countries that choose to be included the right to benefit from exceptions from general treatment (SDT 
and others). Thus, in the context of China’s accession to the WTO, Chinese diplomacy forged a doctrine; that 
of a “developing country that intends to remain that way”. It  has kept to this since then, including in the 
climate negotiations, for example when it decided to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2002 by asserting its right 
to development in order to avoid Annex I (the countries subject to legally binding GHG emissions reduction 
targets) even though at the time it was already one of the world’s top GHG emitters.
15  However, the development gap between China and the rest of the G77 has not failed to create divisions, as 
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without however giving up initiatives (especially the Copenhagen agreement ) that are the 
prerogative of the “powerful”.
The quantification of these two variables comes up against problems such that we must here 
dismiss any notion of producing an empirical analysis of them, however approximate. We 
know that the measurement of power is a research subject in its own right in social science, 
for which conclusions to date are disappointing16. The measurement of State preferences, on 
the other hand, comes up against the same difficulties as those of the preferences of agents in 
market  analysis  –  except  that  the  complexity  of  the  actor  considerably  accentuates  this 
difficulty. We will therefore limit ourselves to an analytical treatment of these two variables – 
not without highlighting in conclusion the need for an original research strategy to measure 
power.
Another aspect concerns the link between these two forces. Is the degree of heterogeneity of 
preferences sensitive to variations in power? Does the asymmetry of the system affect the 
structure of preferences? The constant solidarity thus far of China and the BASIC group with 
the G77 in the climate negotiations is an indication of at least a relative independence of the 
two forces – taking into account the clear increase in power of these countries over the last 20 
years. However, it is clearly not enough to serve as evidence, and the possibility of a change 
of doctrine for China or BASIC in the months or years to come cannot be ruled out, especially 
with the prospect of a growing gap between the average income of the BASIC group and the 
rest of the G77. Our analysis will therefore be based on the assumption of independence of 
these two factors. But it will take into account its fragility when drawing conclusions.
The breakdown of the Rio compromise on sustainable development
Let us now examine how the emergence of the BASIC group and the resulting changes in the 
balance of power destabilised the Rio compromise (1992) on sustainable development. We 
show in particular that variations in power had this effect because they were not accompanied 
by  a  comparable  variation  in  the  other  determinant  of  global  climate  governance:  actor 
preferences.  Thus,  the  Rio  compromise  was  destabilised  not  because  preferences  had 
fundamentally  changed17,  but  because  the  emergence  of  the  BASIC  group  considerably 
increased the weight of the developing countries’ “preference for development” relative to the 
developed countries’ “preference for the environment”. Here, the demonstration situates us 
within  the  constructivist  branch of  IPE,  which  insists  on  the  role  of  compromises  in  the 
creation and stability of international regimes.
The (international) compromise on sustainable development was gradually built in the context 
revealed by the acronym of the group “G77+China” that has appeared over the course of negotiations. See 
Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008 for an examination of the emergence of Brazil, China, India and South 
Africa as a factor in the heterogeneity of preferences within the G77. The authors conclude, however, that 
this heterogeneity is not so great as to threaten the cohesion of the G77 on climate policies.
16  See, for example, the Correlates of War (COW 2010) project on “National Material Capabilities”, which 
uses  six  categories  of criteria  to estimate the national  material  capabilities  of  countries  since 1816. The 
programme recognises that power should not be confused with material capabilities, but it considers that the 
former cannot be understood without taking into account the latter.
17  Or because the underlying scientific consensus had been weakened. In fact, the opposite is true here.
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of the 1970s18 and in that of the 1980s, resulting in its explicit formulation in the Brundtland 
Report  and  in  its  institutionalisation  by  the  Rio  Earth  Summit  in  199219.  The  “Rio 
compromise” became the cornerstone of collective international action in the field of climate 
change, legitimising and guiding in particular the implementation of the Kyoto international 
regime. Its destabilisation since the 2000s is linked, by a large portion of the literature on the 
subject,  to design flaws.  Following the extensive definition of international  regimes20,  we 
highlight  a  different  explanation.  To the  question  “why  has  the  Rio  meta-regime  broken 
down?”, the answer we sketch out in line with constructivism is the following: the balance of 
power has shifted in favour of the preference for development.
The asymmetrical Rio compromise
The Rio Earth Summit established the concept of “sustainable development”21. It made it the 
criterion for guiding and assessing collective international action by deciding to include it in 
the preambles or articles of international treaties and organisations.  According to [Barbier 
E.B. (1987)], sustainable development assumes trade-offs between various goals: economic 
(growth),  biological  (environment)  and  social  (justice,  equity).  In  this  sense,  Rio  is  a 
compromise between heterogeneous preferences. Moreover, for the analyst it is a marker of 
these  preferences  and  the  means  of  understanding  how  their  initial  heterogeneity  was 
overcome, without being an insurmountable obstacle to collective international action.
Any compromise is associated with a problem of diverging preferences: preferences that are 
sufficiently  conflicting  to  prevent  the  formation  of  a  consensus,  but  also  sufficiently 
reconcilable to avoid an outright conflict between actors. A compromise of any kind is thus 
defined as “an agreement/arrangement implying mutual concessions” with a view to reaching 
a common solution that the Parties must jointly implement22. Rio corresponds perfectly to this 
definition23. Stripped back to its basics, it establishes or sets down a hierarchy of priorities and 
thereby solves through political choices a scientifically “undecidable” problem24: that of the 
objective hierarchy between the development outcomes and environment outcomes for our 
area of interest here – the “climate” component of the Rio legacy25.
The  hierarchy  established  in  this  respect  at  Rio  can  be  summarised  by  the  formula 
“environment  before  development”  in  the  sense  that  collective  international  action  was 
required for the first time to include environmental targets in its development goals – and not 
18  Meadows, Meadows, Randers and Behrens 1972.
19  UN-WCED 1987.
20  Haas 1980, 1982, 1990, Ruggie 1975, 1982, 1998.
21  CAS 2012.
22  van Parijs Ph. 2010.
23  Except in terms of enforceability. The Rio Declaration includes 27 founding principles of global cooperation 
for sustainable development, but it is non-binding (CAS 2012, p. 2-3).
24  Indeed, the IPCC consensus does not deal with the hierarchy of problems. It is limited to identifying the 
existence of a climate problem, its causes, its magnitude and, more partially, ways of addressing it. But it can 
by no means serve as proof that the environment should take precedence over development (or vice versa) in 
the hierarchy or priorities.
25  What  makes  Rio  a  compromise  is  not  that  it  asserts  for  the  first  time  in  the  field  of  international 
commitments  the  linkage  between  different  targets,  whether  economic  (growth),  environmental 
(conservation) or social (equity), but that it operates a hierarchy between these targets. The linkage between 
development (which may judiciously include the economic and social targets) and environment is in this 
respect the clear basis of the Rio compromise.
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the other way round. Nor is it difficult to outline the interplay of preferences that resulted in 
this fundamental compromise. It revolves around the conflict (of preferences) between the 
developed countries and the developing countries – the G77 and China in the negotiations. 
Rio  marks  a  major  watershed  after  which  the  preference  for  the  environment  that  had 
gradually emerged in developed countries was placed hierarchically above (and not simply at 
the  same  level  as)  the  international  cooperation  priorities  of  the  developing  countries’ 
“historical”  preference  for  development.  Rio  thus  decided  in  favour  of  the  developed 
countries’ preference – which is enough to clearly differentiate it from a consensus26. It is 
therefore asymmetrical, which by no means prevents it from being a “real” compromise (and 
not a “capitulation” in the words of van Parijs) since the choice in favour of the environment 
is ipso facto offset by a principle concerning the “right to development” (Principle 3 of the 
Declaration) and by the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities (Principle 7), 
which form the legal  basis  of the exception granted to  any country declaring itself  to be 
developing27.  The developing countries give the developed countries the right to place the 
environment at the top of the hierarchy of their collective action. The developed countries 
give the developing countries the right to not do so. The result is not null (status quo ante) in 
that  (i)  it  authorises  some countries to  devote resources  and to  conclude agreements  that 
explicitly make the environment (climate) their priority, and (ii) it gives others the right to not 
do so.  Rio thus  creates  the essential  political  condition needed for  a  legally  binding  and 
differentiated commitment to tackling global warming – the Kyoto regime.
The destabilisation of the Rio compromise
The Rio  compromise  (1992)  between environment  and development,  embodied  in  Kyoto 
some five years later, transposes the asymmetry between environment and development to an 
asymmetry  of  rights  and  obligations.  We often  forget  that  all  of  the  UNFCCC member 
countries have signed the Kyoto Protocol (but not all have ratified it), including the BASIC 
group and the developing countries. The priority to the environment, granted in return for the 
right to development, may be interpreted when reading the Kyoto Protocol as an obligation 
accepted by all for some countries (Annex I) to protect the (climate) environment, in return 
for the right accepted by all and granted to many countries (non-Annex I) to development. 
Kyoto was the first destabilising factor of the Rio compromise. The US refusal to ratify Kyoto 
and Canada’s withdrawal demonstrate a similar refusal to translate an asymmetric system of 
26  Van Parijs Ph. 2010 provides a highly enlightening discussion of what distinguishes a compromise from a 
consensus: a consensus relates to a configuration in which the underlying preferences are harmonious. A 
compromise may evolve into a consensus (this is one of the meanings he gives to the concept of a “good 
compromise”). It is also in the light of this analysis that we can understand the “scientific consensus” on the 
environment produced by the IPCC: a consensus that plays a key role in the hierarchy of priorities since it 
has no equivalent for the two other development pillars.  The IPCC diagnosis that has been continuously 
refined and corroborated over the course of the successive reports has clearly played a decisive role in the 
conversion  of  the  developed  countries’  preference  (conversion  of  the  hierarchy  between  priority  to 
development and priority to the environment).  It  also played a crucial  role in the conclusion of the Rio 
compromise by giving developed countries an argument of “truth” that no other point of the negotiations or 
other category of actors can mobilise. It is even more interesting to observe in these conditions that once the 
Rio compromise was acquired, the United States continually attempted to weaken the scientific consensus in 
negotiations with its  developed country partners  on the design of collective action leading to the Kyoto 
international regime.
27  As already mentioned, the United Nations system has recognised this status of developing countries since the 
1970s and it is declaratory.
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preferences into an asymmetric system of rights and obligations.
Crystallised by the legal form of Kyoto, the destabilisation of Rio is not, however, linked to a 
single, sudden event. It continued throughout the 2000s. The United Nations programme on 
the  Millennium  Development  Goals  (MDGs)  is  another  step  in  this  destabilisation.  The 
compromise on the MDGs revived the conflict of objectives that Rio had settled, shifting the 
priority for collective international action to poverty reduction, in other words to the segment 
linking the “economic” pillar  to the “social”  pillar  of  sustainable development.  Action in 
favour of the environment (climate and other aspects) was not removed from the Millennium 
programme goals and targets. But contrary to what was achieved at Rio, it slipped down in the 
hierarchy of norms.
The final milestone in the destabilisation of Rio was provided by the turning point in Bali 
(2007). The Kyoto international regime that set the rules for collective action for the first 
commitment  period  (2007-2012)  is  based  on  the  principle  of  legally  binding  emission 
allowances (or cap and trade) for the Annex I countries – developed countries and certain 
transition countries. The negotiations on the post-2012 regime launched at COP13 in Bali saw 
the emergence of the concept of NAMAs28, which in many ways is analysed as a strategic 
alternative to emission allowances. Led by India and supported by many other developing 
countries, NAMAs are one of the strategic tools with which the developing countries went on 
to oppose the developed country project to extend the system of legally binding allowances to 
the  top  emitters  among  the  developing  countries  from  the  second  commitment  period29. 
Arguing  once  again  the  right  to  development,  but  this  time  also  claiming  the  right  to 
sovereignty, the developing countries found in NAMAs support for their demand to initiate 
national  plans,  certainly  measurable  and  verifiable30,  but  decided  in  a  sovereign  manner 
according to the modalities that best suit them, which was approved by the COP in Cancun in 
201031.
Of course the “Copenhagen failure” – a procedural failure in that the COP in Copenhagen was 
supposed to conclude the Bali process – cannot be reduced to the simple impossibility of 
settling  the  conflict  between  the  principle  of  allowances  supported  by  some  developed 
countries  and  that  of  NAMAs  supported  by  the  developing  countries,  especially  as  the 
position  on  this  subject  of  the  foremost  power,  the  United  States,  has  since  remained 
inconsistent and indecipherable. But this conflict concerning the modus operandi of collective 
action is nevertheless one of the aspects of the “Copenhagen failure” that in procedural terms 
indicates more specifically the “Bali failure”. Not only did the Rio compromise fail to build a 
consensus  on  environment  and  development  (convergence  of  initially  conflicting 
28  Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs) are mentioned for the first time in paragraph 1(b)(ii) of 
the Bali Action Plan. For a detailed examination, see van Asselt et al. (2010), who indicate that the positions 
of the four BASIC countries on NAMAs are very similar, particularly in that they see them as a mechanism 
(i)  that  is  distinct  from that  of  binding commitments  (in  accordance  with the  principle  of  common but 
differentiated  responsibilities),  and  that  relate  to  (ii)  “mitigation  measures  that  should  not  limit  their  
development” (p.65, emphasis added).
29  The specialised literature more readily describes this change as a shift from a top-down process (Kyoto) to a 
bottom-up process that is less centralised and more sensitive to State sovereignty.
30  MRV mechanism (measurement, reporting and verification) endorsed by the CPOP in Cancun (2010) to 
which is added the possibility for the UNFCCC to conduct “technical inspections of all climate policies in 
developing countries, whether subsidised or not” [CAS (2011), p. 3].
31  CAS 2011.
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preferences),  but  it  has  been  weakened  to  the  point  of  now  being  destabilised  by  the 
remarkable consistency of the initially categorical positions of the parties concerned on their 
hierarchy of objectives.  The explanation for its  destabilisation is  not therefore so much a 
change of preferences as the underlying variations in the balance of power and the impact of 
these variations on the capacity of the different actors to influence the outcome.
The redistribution of power in the world between Rio 1992 and Rio 2012 is undoubtedly one 
of the main facets of the problem. Although it cannot be completely reduced to the stylised 
facts of the emergence of the BASIC group, there is no doubt that the BASIC countries are 
the key actors in it32. This is true individually for the three largest among them. Beyond the 
previous indications, the following figures give an overview of the increase in weight of these 
countries on different registers of power between 1990 and 2009 (table 2).
Table 2. Weight of BASIC in the distribution of global GDP, trade and GHG emissions 
1990-2009 (as %)
Share of GDP 
(PPP, 2005 dollars)
Share of world trade 
in goods
Share of global 
GHG emissions
1990 2009 1990 2009 1990 2009
Developed countries 60.0 56.0 79.0 64.0 62.0 48.0
USA 21.4 19.9 16.5 13.90 19.92 18.33
European Union 18.4 15.1 18.8 16.8 17.88 13.35
Developing countries 40.0 44.0 21.0 36.0 38.0 52.0
BASIC 10.3 21.6 4.9 15.3 19.5 28.2
China 3.5 12.8 2.6 11.6 12 19.1
Brazil 3 2.8 1.3 1.5 2.3 2.7
South Africa 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.8 1.5 1.4
India 3 5.3 0.7 2.2 3.7 5
Data: IMF, OECD, WTO and UNFCCC – WRI, authors’ calculations
The very concept of BASIC did not exist at Rio (1992). The BASIC group is now a formal 
coalition that provides an opportunity for discussions and periodic summits aimed at forging 
or consolidating a common position on the main subjects of global governance: trade, finance 
but  also  climate  negotiations33.  The  BASIC  countries  thus  surprised  many  observers 
somewhat during the conclusion of COP15 in Copenhagen by getting the United States to 
agree to finalise together (and without Europe or other influential actors) the common text to 
32  Jacquet  P.  2010  attributes  a  far  greater  importance  to  the  power  factor  than  in  the  report  on  global 
governance (CAE 2002), of which P. Jacquet is one of the co-authors. Far from indicating a shortcoming of 
the  2002 report,  this  appreciation of  the  power  factor,  alongside  that  of  the  sensitivity to  global  goods 
(already central in the 2002 report) is in our view a clear indication of the specific change that took place 
between these two dates.
33  As noted by Hallding, Olsson, Atteridge, Vihma, Carson and Roman 2011, p. 13, the high visibility of the 
BASIC group on climate change should not obscure the fact that its rationale is far broader.
10
Congrès AFSP Paris 2013
serve as (the basis of the) final declaration.
These  elements  are  clearly  not  enough to  provide  proof  that  variations  in  power,  and  in 
particular those induced by the emergence of the BASIC group, were the key factor in the 
destabilisation  of  the  Rio  compromise.  This  would  require,  inter  alia,  eliminating  certain 
conceptual and methodological problems that punctuate the long and gloomy debate on the 
measurement of power. Our intention here is far less ambitious and on a different level. It 
consists in attempting to follow to a conclusion the line of analysis based on the heterogeneity 
of preferences. Finding that the essential dividing line in this field of preferences had not 
fundamentally  varied  since  Rio  1992,  it  follows  that  the  explanation  of  a  change  in  the 
outcome (the evident weakening of the initial compromise) must at least partly result from the 
variation of the relative capacity of actors to influence the outcome of the negotiation process. 
The rise of the BASIC group is thus the strongest contender for explaining the increasing 
power of the developing countries and, hence, the questioning of the hierarchy of norms34 for 
which the developed countries succeeded in gaining support 20 years ago in a very different 
context of the distribution of power35.
Changing the game and shifting regime
The constructivist perspective has enabled us to identify a first effect of the emergence of the 
BASIC powers on the course of global climate governance: the Rio founding compromise has 
broken down rather than evolving into a consensus, in the words of Van Parijs. The rationalist 
perspective36 that we adopt in this part enables us to pinpoint a second effect of the emergence 
of the BASIC countries: the effect of a change of game, which complements the previous one.
Rationalism  approaches  international  institutional  arrangements  using  the  tools  of  game 
theory and from the viewpoint of the problems of collective action posed by the heterogeneity 
of actor preferences – and the resulting strategic interactions. These elements constitute the 
basis  of  the  rationalist  theory  of  international  regimes  in  which  the  heterogeneity  of 
34  We know that this notion of the “hierarchy of norms” has been one of the fundamental concepts of the theory 
of law since Kelsen. We refer to it here with caution and after having focused on the notion of the “hierarchy 
of priorities”, because it goes without saying that what we are dealing with here is essentially a political 
process that incorporates aspects of law, but is not confined to these. In our view, the idea of the hierarchy of 
norms taken from the language of law nevertheless seems to be the best for examining the fundamental 
problem of global governance if we indeed understand this as the problem of ensuring compatibility between 
the different sectoral regulations (issue areas).
35  A more comprehensive study on the impact of variations in power on the course of the Rio compromise 
should assuredly take into account at least two other important aspects: (i) the weight of Russia (Rio took 
place one year after the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union), and (ii) the heterogeneity of preferences 
within each of the two generic categories of preferences that we have looked at here: that of the developed 
countries and that of the developing countries.
36  See the EPI survey by Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998, p. 646. Rationalism and constructivism are 
presented in it as the two main general theoretical orientations. Rationalism produces a problem solving type 
heuristic: the identification and resolution of a problem by rational actors whose preferences or interests may 
be clearly specified.  Derived from economics,  this general  theoretical orientation covers not  only liberal 
arguments that insist on absolute gains and the voluntary nature of agreements, but also realist arguments that 
insist instead on relative gains and the role of power and coercion. By contrast, the heuristics produced by the 
constructivist theories draw upon the human sciences and sociology. They insist on the identity of actors (as 
opposed  to  their  rationality)  and  focus  on  the  way in  which  “reality”  is  socially  constructed.  See  also 
[Hasenclever A., Mayer P., Rittberger V. (1997)], [Snidal D., Thompson A. (2000)].
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preferences  creates  incentives  to  establish  and  maintain  international  regimes37.  The 
configurations of preferences are divided according to four categories.
The  first  two  (configurations  of  purely  harmonious  preferences  and  purely  conflicting 
preferences)  are  of  little  interest  in  the  sense  that  they  create  no  incentive  to  cooperate. 
Cooperation is pointless in a harmonious game, and impossible in a purely conflicting game38.
The  other  two  are  situations  of  mixed  configurations  of  actor  preferences  (partially 
harmonious  and  partially  conflicting).  Following  on  from  [Stein  A.  (1983)],  these 
intermediate situations are divided into two categories according to the type of dilemma and 
problem of collective action that they raise: “a dilemma of common interests” giving rise to a 
problem of collaboration for some; and a dilemma of “common aversion” with a problem of 
coordination for others39. The problems of collaboration generated by dilemmas of common 
interests  relate  to  market  failures  that  cooperation  helps to  correct  by means of  common 
disciplines that bring actors closer to the Pareto frontier  – as long as free riding40 can be 
effectively avoided.  By contrast,  the  problems of  coordination  generated  by dilemmas of 
common aversion relate to a conflict of distribution along the Pareto frontier. There are “many 
points along the Pareto frontier”41, in other words a situation of multiple equilibria that are 
collectively indifferent but individually different.
How can this general problem shed light on the climate negotiation game? First, it makes it 
possible to approach the indeterminacy that has characterised global climate governance since 
COP13 in Bali as a problem of coordination. Next, it helps to better understand the role that 
variations in power have played in converting a regime of collaboration established by Kyoto 
into a battle of the sexes game whose outcome also depends on the factor of power.
A problem of coordination
The  climate  negotiations  are  closer  today  to  a  dilemma  of  common  aversion  than  to  a 
dilemma of common interests. The previous section left us with the notion of a conflict of 
preferences at  the most essential level: that of the hierarchy of norms. A conflict that the 
BASIC group revived by using its increased negotiating power to support the developing 
countries’ “preference for development”.
This concept of the hierarchy of norms is important as it avoids distorting the debate. Indeed, 
the preference for development should not be mistaken for indifference (not to say hostility) 
towards the environment - and vice versa for developed countries. The other major feature of 
the climate negotiations is precisely that they have succeeded in raising awareness in most, if 
not all countries42 about the need to act, and thus to implement plans and commit resources to 
reduce GHG emissions. The scientific consensus plays a role in this, as does education and 
37  Krasner 1991, p. 338.
38  The “game” of global climate governance is clearly neither harmonious nor purely conflicting.
39  See also Kébabdjian 1999, p. 152 et seq.
40  Indeed, free riding is the main obstacle to collaboration – in other words to cooperation aimed at achieving a 
common “Pareto superior” goal.
41  Krasner 1991.
42  The  positions  of  OPEC in  particular  and  the  spectacular  attempts  by  Saudi  Arabia  to  destabilise  the 
Copenhagen Conference in December 2009 indeed give the impression that among the developing countries, 
one category of countries is an exception.
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the  information  produced  by  the  negotiations.  We  cannot  therefore  see  the  current 
indeterminacy as evidence of a purely conflicting game pitting advanced countries determined 
to  satisfy  a  uniform  preference  for  the  environment  against  developing  countries  firmly 
committed to pursuing their development strategies with no action undertaken in the field of 
the environment.  The effective commitment off  the developing countries through national 
plans is certainly variable – including within the BASIC group itself, where South Africa is 
clearly less dedicated than Brazil or China43. But the commitment of the developed countries 
is no less variable.
Attributing to each category of actors an unambiguous preference would mean assimilating 
the US refusal to participate in the Kyoto regime with a complete and sudden rejection of any 
environmental policy. This is evidently not the case. And just as a refusal to cooperate should 
not be confused with a refusal to act,  care must be taken not to assimilate any failure of 
cooperation with an actor’s refusal to cooperate – associated with an incentive to free ride in 
the prisoner’s dilemma.
It is precisely at this point that the problem of coordination emerges, a conjunction of three 
phenomena:  the  determination  of  actors  to  act  is  real  (it  is  the  “common aversion”  that 
prompts  them  to  act),  cooperation  is  needed  for  action  to  be  effective,  but  there  is  a 
divergence concerning the purpose of the cooperation. As Kébabdjian put it, “the difficulties 
arise due to the will to cooperate: the choice to be together (cooperation) no longer appears as 
a means but as an objective, although this does not prevent a conflict”44, adding later that, in 
this type of configuration, “there are several equilibria; consequently the outcome of the game 
is uncertain”45.
We can represent this simply in the form of a “battle of the sexes” type matrix (figure 1). Let 
us assume that the climate negotiation game is reduced to two actors (A and B) in which A 
represents by convention the position of the developed countries and B that of the developing 
countries. Let us give each of these two possible options (indexed 1 and 2) and let us call 
“cooperation”  the  situations  in  which  both  actors  abide  by  the  same hierarchy of  norms 
(development first or environment first). Let us also give the actors the capacity to classify the 
results of the interaction of their choices according to an ordinal scale46 of satisfaction: 1 < 2 < 
3 < 4.
This  matrix  highlights  a  situation  of  high  interdependence  since  in  the  absence  of  an 
agreement on the hierarchy of norms, the result is deficient both collectively and individually 
(boxes II or III). This high interdependence is due to the fact that in the coordination game, 
the actors have no dominant strategy (one that guarantees the actor a result that is superior to 
the other, whatever the other actor does).
The matrix also makes it possible to confirm that the hierarchy of norms chosen certainly 
guarantees a “Pareto superior” solution (boxes I and IV), but that it raises a secondary conflict 
concerning the distribution of benefits (alternatively of costs) of collective action. 
43  Heggelund 2007 and Kasa, Gullberg and Heggelund 2008 describe the position of climate policy in the 
priorities for foreign and national policy in China.
44  Kébabdjian 1999, p. 166, emphasis added.
45  Idem  p. 166, emphasis added.
46  Snidal 1985a, p. 92, for the advantages and limitations of ordinal 2 x 2 games.
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Figure 1. The battle of the sexes game
This specification distinguishes between pure coordination games (such as the chicken game) 
and games that, like that of the battle of the sexes represented here, associate a problem of 
distribution with the problem of coordination. This is the case when the two actors do not 
obtain (or do not expect) the same “benefit” from their cooperation.
This  figure  clearly  schematises  the  problem  of  climate  negotiations.  It  presents  the  Rio 
compromise (circled in figure 1) as the commitment of all countries to cooperation – even 
when they are, like the developing countries in Kyoto, exempted from any commitment other 
than  reporting.  A biased  commitment  (we  said  asymmetric)  in  favour  of  the  advanced 
countries  (box I)  makes  the  solidity  of  the  initial  compromise  (and  therefore  that  of  the 
associated institutional arrangements) dependent on the stability of the balance of power from 
which it emerged. The developing countries might indeed have expected more. They could 
also be satisfied with the concessions the developed countries grant them by considering that 
the failure of Rio – Kyoto would be detrimental to all of them.
By launching negotiations on the second commitment period, Bali and the conferences that 
have followed have reopened the game. Not because the developing countries were waiting 
for a window of opportunity to open in the negotiation agenda, but because the distribution of 
power had considerably changed at Bali. The allowances versus NAMAs conflict is one of the 
clearest  expressions  of  this.  The  conflict  concerning  the  conditionality  of  funding 
(conditionality of commitment) is another.
The characteristic of the climate negotiations is not free riding. It is not that the developing 
(or developed) countries would be tempted to defect – the temptation to free ride is in fact nil 
in this kind of game. And we are in turn tempted to think that, in view of the 20 years of 
climate negotiations, this is more or less so in reality. The main defection in this game will 
have been that of the foremost power, which can by no means be analysed as an example of 
free riding. The aim of the United States does not seem to be to slyly defect, but rather to 
move the negotiations into the sphere of a different hierarchy of norms – one that is more 
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consistent  with  its  initial  preference47 (box IV).  The outcome is  again uncertain  and this 
indeterminacy makes it impossible to rule out the risk of a cooperation failure (boxes II and 
III).  What  threatens the process underway is  not  defection/cheating,  but  the failure of all 
cooperation even though i) the problem is getting worse (the need to act is increasing) and ii) 
the countries are expressing growing demands for cooperation.
Finally,  the  matrix  helps  to  fully  understand  that  the  “power  of  knowledge”  (scientific 
consensus) is of little help in settling this secondary conflict (the conflict that cooperation 
triggers by settling another). This is not a problem of information or of trust. That would be 
the case if the problem was limited to one of coordination (such as the chicken game). But the 
problem of coordination is coupled with a problem of distribution on which the information 
produced by institutions is likely to be ineffective – except that it  may reveal even more 
crudely who gains most –, information that is crippling when the actors are more sensitive to 
relative gains than to absolute gains. The problem boils down to one of the distribution of 
gains and charges that only the balance of power can settle – in the absence of a higher 
authority (see figure 2 for a representation).
Figure 2. Illustration
Sources: authors based on [Stein A. (1990)] and [Kébabdjian G. (1999), p. 163].
There are two ways of eliminating this indeterminacy. The first consists in building tactical 
47  It should be noted that the Bali Conference in 2007 marked the renewed commitment of the US diplomacy 
to  the  multilateral  climate  negotiations  after  a  withdrawal,  then  plurilateral  attempts  within  the  Major 
Economies meetings.
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linkages  between  subjects  in  order  to  offset  in  one  field  what  is  lost  in  another.  The 
Millennium  Development  Goals  (2000)  can  be  considered  from  this  perspective:  an 
agreement  based on a  hierarchy of  norms that  is  partly  the opposite  of the Rio – Kyoto 
hierarchy, or even the emergence following the COP in Poznan (2008) of issues of adaptation 
and  its  funding.  The  other  derives  from  the  balance  of  power,  and  therefore  from  the 
mobilisation  of  capacities  of  power.  As  long as  preferences  are  polarised  and invariable, 
power will be the deciding factor. And if, like Krasner, we take into account the fact that the 
linkages  are  far  from  being  indifferent  to  power,  we  will  conclude  with  him  that  the 
distribution of power better explains the institutional arrangements between States than their 
joint efforts to find a solution to market failures48.
The global effect of BASIC on the distribution of power
At  this  stage,  we  have  established  that  variations  in  the  distribution  of  power  affect  the 
structure of the game. We now have to explain why the new balance of power created by the 
emergence of the BASIC group results in an indeterminate outcome. It is one thing to observe 
that the factor of power plunges actors into a world of multiple equilibria;  but it  is quite 
another to explain why this factor of power does not make it possible to select a specific point 
on the Pareto frontier. Indeed, why does the emergence of the BASIC group translate, at least 
up until now, not into a change of international regime, but into the absence of any regime in 
this field until 2020 at the earliest?
This question deals less with the “dynamics of power” (its variations over time) than with 
what we will call the “statics of power”: its distribution at a given moment and, by extension, 
the degree of asymmetry of the international system. IPE discussed this at length in the 1970s 
and 1980s, during the development phases of hegemonic stability theory (HST). Its relevance 
to our purposes is clear. Since power is relative, the emergence of the BASIC group implies, 
all other things being equal, a certain dilution/deconcentration of power at the global level. 
We could also say that the emergence of the BASIC group has been a factor in the reduction 
of  asymmetry in  international  relations.  This  leads  us  to  a  conjecture about  the  effect  of 
asymmetry on the outcome of the game rather than on its form.
In reality, HST proposes two contrasting answers to this question. This is due to the fact that 
HST (following the designation by Keohane that has become commonplace) is not a unified 
theory, but a research programme informed by the controversy between the two main streams 
of  rationalism (the  liberal  branch  and  the  realist  branch)  based  on  common  foundations 
formulated  by  Kindleberger.  According  to  Kindleberger,  “for  the  world  economy  to  be 
stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer – one stabilizer”49.
For the realist stream, the solution to problems of collective action depends on the existence 
of  a  hegemonic power – and thus  on a  high level  of  asymmetry  in  the system. Realism 
therefore agrees with Kindleberger’s conclusion on the single leader/hegemon, but it explains 
it differently using the argument of relative gains. The liberals consider, on the other hand, 
that  the solution to problems of  collective action may emerge in  a perfectly symmetrical 
world – in other words with no power differential between countries. This is the "tit for tat” 
48  Krasner 1991, p. 337.
49  Kindleberger 1973, p. 312.
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solution based on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma50. However, the “cooperative”51 solution is 
too  fragile  and  conditional  to  have  any  explanatory  power  in  the  field  of  international 
relations. The liberal branch shows that a solution may also emerge from cooperation between 
powers. The “K-group” theory52 thus establishes that having just one leader is not a necessary 
condition for the stability of the system. It is true that this result depends on the behaviour of 
actors motivated by absolute gains and that the outcome in question is consequently more a 
matter of “moving closer to the Pareto frontier” than “eliminating indeterminacy along this 
Pareto frontier”.
Despite  their  differences,  these two branches of HST validate  the same general  outcome. 
Asymmetry  is  “recommended”  to  find  a  solution  to  problems  of  international  collective 
action. The monopoly of power advocated by Kindleberger and by the realist authors is a 
borderline  case  of  this  asymmetry.  All  in  all,  it  is  of  little  interest  for  global  climate 
governance, where the most fundamental dividing line is situated between countries that are 
differentiated by their development gaps and consequently their preferences, rather than by 
their differences in terms of power.
This debate is of interest to us because it makes the asymmetry of power a key factor in the 
creation and maintenance of international regimes (table 3, Annex). But its conclusions must 
be projected into the context of the heterogeneity of preferences on the hierarchy of norms. 
Power is then the only operator that can solve the problem and produce the hierarchy of 
norms necessary for the creation and maintenance of an international regime. There is no 
solution  to  a  dilemma of  common  aversion  like  the  one  currently  facing  global  climate 
governance without the intervention of power – and therefore without asymmetry. The Rio-
Kyoto process proves that global climate regulation is not doomed to remain locked in this 
dilemma. And it is in fact the shift in the balance of power caused by the emergence of the 
BASIC group that has led to the current indeterminacy, by giving the BASIC countries the 
opportunity to support the preference for development of the G77+China. But it does not yet 
seem sufficient to lead it to impose on the developed countries a compromise built on the 
opposite grounds.
This  point  is  illustrated by table  3 which summarises the main characteristics of  the Rio 
(1992) regime and encapsulates the contributing factors to its rise and fall, taking climate 
change negotiations  as  a  storyline.  We define  the  collective  situation framing the  regime 
(distribution of power, social objectives, consensual knowledge) and its descriptive variables 
(institutions, principles and rules)53. The Rio “meta” regime is described in the second line, 
emerging as a compromise between a powerful “North” with preferences for the environment 
(as the subsequent Rio Conventions testify) and a less powerful “South” (the Basic did not 
exist at this time) with preferences for development. The compromise is reached through the 
Common but  differentiated  responsibility  principle  granting  more  favourable  treatment  to 
developing  countries  (last  column)  and  a  tactical  issue-linkage  between  poverty  and 
environment54.  Strikingly  enough,  this  principle  remains  stable  over  time (top to  bottom) 
50  Axelrod 1984.
51  Cooperative in the sense that all actors are led rationally to relinquish their initial preference for free riding.
52  Snidal 1985b.
53  Drawing on Krasner 1983, Haas 1980, and Ruggie 1975, 1982.
54  “Poverty is a major cause and effect of global environmental problems” (Our Common Future, Brundtland 
report, I.1.8).
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while the distribution of power is reshuffled (second column), social objectives erode and 
their scope widens (third column) and initial consensual knowledge tumbles (fourth column) 
in spite of attempts to sustain the momentum with consensus building tentative reports – eg. 
the Stern  Review on the economics of climate change, the  Sukhdev Report on the cost of 
biodiversity losses55.  The current situation (last line) shows a large spectrum of active players 
with more symmetry in power distribution than ever since 1992, a large spectrum of unsolved 
problems or issue areas without clear tactical, substantive or fragmented linkages  – except 
through  countries’  commitment  in  The  Future  We  Want,  the  Rio+20  Conference  final 
document (UN, 2012) to define sustainable development goals (SDGs) by 201556. 
In  the  current  indeterminacy  we  have  described,  SDGs  appear  as  a  transparent  and 
conservative  attempt  to  re-link  issues  which  have  been  progressively  de-linked  and  de-
institutionalized since the Rio Earth Summit in 1992, as Rio+20 Conference final document 
testifies:  
“We recognize that the development of goals could also be useful for pursuing focused and 
coherent action on sustainable development. We further recognize the importance and utility 
of a set of sustainable development goals, based on Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of 
Implementation,  which  fully  respect  all  the  Rio  Principles,  taking  into  account  different 
national circumstances, capacities and priorities, are consistent with international law, build 
upon commitments already made, and contribute to the full implementation of the outcomes 
of all major summits in the economic, social and environmental fields, including the present 
outcome document. The goals should address and incorporate in a balanced way all three 
dimensions of sustainable development and their interlinkages. They should be coherent with 
and integrated into the United Nations development agenda beyond 2015, thus contributing to 
the achievement of sustainable development and serving as a driver for implementation and 
mainstreaming of sustainable development in the United Nations system as a whole.”57 
This sounds, in a way, to something like “from Rio (1992) to Rio (2012) and back again”. Is 
the conservative shift  toward a “post-2015 sustainable development regime” suggested by 
The Future We Want  plausible on the basis of the current indeterminacy and change in the 
game  we  have  described?  Conservative  and  radical  changes  to  an  international regime 
roughly parallel Stephen Krasner’s distinction between changes within regimes and changes 
to a regime itself58. Modification of rules and decision-making procedures, Krasner argues, 
are changes within regimes. These occur in response to new external conditions, but they do 
not reflect fundamental shifts in values.  By contrast,  changes in principles and norms are 
changes to a regime itself. They indicate that basic regime tenets are under challenge, often 
because one group of states is seeking to replace them with competing tenets59. The precedent 
of the Copenhagen climate change agreement, which does not content any reference to the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibility, tend to suggest that a radically new 
regime can emerge at  the initiative of  a few leading countries  creating de facto a power 
asymmetry, when these additionally break up the overarching principle of the previous order. 
55  Stern 2006, Sukhdev et al. 2010.
56  The Future We Want, Rio+20 Final Outcome Document, 19 June 2012, http://rio20.net/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/N1238164.pdf
57  UN 2012, p. 46, §236;
58  Krasner 1983.
59  Helfer 2003, p. 15.
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Conversely,  sticking  to  such  a  principle  in  a  symmetric  game is  much more  unlikely  to 
generate any regime at all.  The conditions for a climate regime to be stable are the very 
conditions which makes its emergence a seemingly impossible task.
Conclusion
This article began by establishing the idea of a radical indeterminacy surrounding the future 
of  global  climate  regulation.  This  indeterminacy  takes  the  form of  a  questioning  of  the 
compromise on sustainable development negotiated in Rio in 1992 and of the resulting Kyoto 
international regime.
The article has attempted to explain the role of the “BASIC effect” in this indeterminacy by 
following the line of analysis of international political economy (IPE) and by mobilising two 
categories  of  political  factors:  the  heterogeneity  of  preferences  and  variations  in  the 
distribution of power. There was no question of inferring from this still rudimentary base any 
predictions concerning solutions to this current indeterminacy. The distribution of power in 
1992 enabled the developed countries to exercise leadership. The distribution resulting from 
the emergence of the BASIC group now prevents the leadership function from playing its role 
in the production of a stable hierarchy of norms.
Our  work  also  highlights  two  types  of  conclusions,  of  which  one  in  particular  proposes 
complementary avenues for research.
First,  we have undoubtedly not insisted enough on the originality of the Rio compromise 
(1992).  It  is  unique  in  international  economic relations  in  that  it  associates  in  an  almost 
organic manner two major target areas (environment and development) and finally required 
actors to decide on the hierarchy between these. That the IPCC established the reality and the 
intensity of the climate threat is one thing; inferring from this an argument for priority to the 
environment over  development in the hierarchy of target areas for collective international 
action  is  another  that  neither  economics  nor  other  scientific  disciplines  can  justify  in  a 
normative manner. It is precisely on this point that Rio (1992) was a highly risky gamble. Rio 
1992 focused the conflict of preference on a scientifically undecidable point.
The hierarchy of norms is an eminently political subject, for which only the distribution of 
power at the time of the Rio Conference enabled the developed countries to tip the balance in 
favour  of  their  preference  with,  as  in  any  compromise,  considerable  concessions  to  the 
developing countries’ preference for development.
The originality of Rio lies in effect in the fact that it  breaks from one of the established 
principles of international relations: that of choosing a specific issue area precisely to avoid 
conflicts  concerning the hierarchy of norms and to  confine the expression of conflicts  of 
preference to the positions of each party on one single subject. By associating two areas under 
the umbrella of sustainable development60,  Rio placed States in a game configuration that 
60  In  reality,  even by associating three target  areas,  as  the social  pillar  is,  as  we know, distinct  from the 
economic pillar and the environmental pillar in the Brundtland definition, which has been the conceptual 
reference of international public policies since Rio. Here, we have intentionally limited the analysis to the 
environment – development duo.
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required them to produce a hierarchy (at the risk of the compromise otherwise remaining in 
limbo), a configuration that we have shown has no other outcome than the balance of power 
resulting in unequal satisfaction for actors and the absolute sensitivity of this compromise to 
changes in this balance of power.
Next, and beyond the case of the emergence of the BASIC group, the factor of asymmetry (of 
power) must be reassessed. This is in principle the role of international political economy and 
one of the main justifications of its development in the continuation of a discipline, economic 
science,  in  which it  is  almost  systematically  excluded (or  weakened)61.  Yet,  by a  strange 
paradox, this factor, which was to some extent included in the DNA of international political 
economy, has been declining almost continuously over time – as if the economic logicism 
attractor should inevitably have the same effect as the one observed on the economy. The 
(relative) disinterest of conventional IPE for power and asymmetry could once be factually 
justified. The emergence of the BASIC group in the 2000s is in this respect a call for IPE to 
resume its research programmes on power. This is what we have initiated here by limiting 
ourselves to an analytical approach. This is a first stage, which calls for at least two others.
The  first  remains  situated  in  the  analytical  field.  It  consists  in  examining  heterogeneous 
coalitions such as the Major Economies Forum (MEF62) in the field of climate negotiations, 
but also the Group of 20 (G20) formed in the context of the current crisis. The G7 and the 
BASIC group are both relatively homogenous coalitions from the viewpoint of preferences, 
because they are relatively homogenous in terms of development. The MEF and the G20 are 
recent creations in the international negotiation process that are probably not yet stabilised. 
Their relative heterogeneity in terms of the same criterion of preferences and of the level of 
development indicate that they are coalitions of powers whose rationale is not to “dictate the 
world  order”  to  countries  that  lack  negotiating  power,  but  to  attempt  to  solve  through 
consensus  the  foremost  problem of  global  governance:  that  of  producing  a  hierarchy  of 
norms.
The other stage lies within the field of empirical validation – and therefore within that of the 
difficult  problem  of  the  measurement  of  power  and  of  the  degree  of  asymmetry  in  the 
international system. For this, we can use as a guide the avenues opened in the 1980s in line 
with by Snidal’s “K-group” theory: the determination of a critical threshold of asymmetry that 
directly echoes the previous discussion and makes it  possible to establish an optimal size 
criterion for the coalition of powers63. In another vein, we can also follow the line drawn by 
the Occam’s razor principle, which opens up an avenue on the subject of the measurement of 
the relative weight of the US economy that is both robust and simple, since it mobilises only 
three series of variables: GDP, income/ha and the number of countries in the world64. In any 
case, it is clear that this key stage in the measurement process must be based on a body of 
analysis. This is what we have attempted to outline here.
61  Here, we must recall the expression by Perroux 1971: “power, that recalcitrant exile”.
62  The Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate was set up to follow on from the Bali Roadmap (2007) 
and the Major Economies  Meetings  initiated by President  Bush. Since 2009, it  has associated 17 States 
(including those of the G8 and BASIC), representing 80% of GHG emissions and around 80% of world 
energy consumption.
63  Seminal work from Schelling 1978.
64  Krugman 1995.
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Table 3: The rise and fall of the Rio (1992) regime
Time
COLLECTIVE SITUATION
Issue linkages 
REGIME CHARACTERISTICS
Distribution of  
power
Social objectives Consensual  
knowledge
Institutions Principles and rules
1992-2000
Rio regime
Predominance of 
US and EU
Environmental: 
climate change, 
biodiversity, 
desertification, 
Agenda 21
Global warming 
(IPCC)
Universal solutions: 
internalization of 
environmental 
externalities (market 
based instruments)
Poverty and 
environment 
(Brundtland report) 
Globalization and 
sustainable 
development (WTO 
Preamble)
Commission on 
Sustainable 
Development 
(CSD)
UNFCCC
Kyoto Protocol 
(KP)
Convention on 
Biodiversity (CBD)
Common but 
differentiated 
responsibility
 
Polluter-pay principle
2000-2002
Erosion
Predominance of 
US and EU
 
Environmental: 
climate change, 
biodiversity, 
Agenda 21
Global warming 
(IPCC)
Sustainable 
development recipes:  
.internalization of 
environmental 
Poverty reduction 
as development
CSD
UNFCCC
KP
CBD
+ 
Foundations
Common but 
differentiated 
responsibility
 
Polluter-pay principle
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Time
COLLECTIVE SITUATION
Issue linkages 
REGIME CHARACTERISTICS
Distribution of  
power
Social objectives Consensual  
knowledge
Institutions Principles and rules
+ 
Millenium 
development goals 
(MDGs)
externalities (market 
based instruments)
+
.Public private 
partnerships (PPP), 
Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR), 
private standards
2002-2012
Contestation
US and EU 
contested by the 
BASIC
Environmental: 
climate change, 
biodiversity, 
Agenda 21
+ 
MDGs
+ 
Green growth
Climate gate
Stern report
Sukhdev report 
No development 
recipes (we all know 
we don’t know) 
Green economy and 
social inclusion
Un-
institutionalization 
(Learning 
platforms/networks) 
Un-statization 
(volontary 
commitments)
Un-UNisation 
(Copenhagen 
Common but 
differentiated 
responsibility
 
Polluter-pay principle
Consumer-pay principle
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Time
COLLECTIVE SITUATION
Issue linkages 
REGIME CHARACTERISTICS
Distribution of  
power
Social objectives Consensual  
knowledge
Institutions Principles and rules
Policy experiments:
Randomized 
controlled trial 
(MDGs)
Millenium villages 
(MDGs)
Emission trading 
schemes (KP)
Payments for 
environmental 
services (CBD)
climate change 
accord)
2012-2015
Refoundation ?
A large spectrum of 
active players 
without clear 
hierarchy:
US 
A large spectrum of 
unsolved problems:
Environmental: 
climate change, 
biodiversity, 
Agenda 21
Sustaining the 
momentum (Stern 
Report 2.0, IPCC 
report AR5)
No sustainable 
development recipes 
MDGs and 
Sustainable 
development 
through Sustainable 
development goals 
(SDGs)
Re-
institutionalization 
(Learning 
platforms/networks) 
Re-statization 
(volontary 
Common but 
differentiated 
responsibility
 
Polluter-pay principle
Consumer-pay principle
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Time
COLLECTIVE SITUATION
Issue linkages 
REGIME CHARACTERISTICS
Distribution of  
power
Social objectives Consensual  
knowledge
Institutions Principles and rules
EU 
BASIC
Middle income
Least developed 
countries
+ 
MDGs
+ 
Green growth
+ 
Social inclusion
(we all know we don’t 
know) 
Sustainable 
development goals
commitments)
Re-UNisation 
(Copenhagen 
climate change 
accord)
Source : Authors
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